Grade Inflation under the Threat of Students’ Nuisance: Theory and Evidence

This study examines a channel, students ’ nuisance, to explain grade inflation. “Students ’ nui-sance ” is defined by “students ’ pestering the professors for better grades. ” This paper contains two parts: the game theoretic model and the empirical tests. The model shows that the poten-tial threat of students ’ nuisance can induce the professors to inflate grades. Ceteris paribus, a student is more likely to study little and to pester the professor for a better grade if: 1. the pro-fessor is lenient; 2. the studying cost is high; 3. the reward from pestering is high; 4. the cost of pestering is low. My original survey data show that 70%+ of professors think that students ’ nuisance is “an-noying ” and “costly in terms of time, effort, and energy. ” Regression results indicate that the more the student values the grade, the higher the studying cost, and the more likely the student is to pester the professor