We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees with hourly wages. Work effort neither reacts to an increase of the own wage, nor to a positive or negative peer comparison. This result seems at odds with numerous laboratory experiments that show a clear own wage sensitivity on effort. In an additional real-effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables to exactly calculate employer’s surplus from the work contract is a crucial pre-requisite for a positive wage-effort relation. This demonstrates that employee’s reciprocity requires a clear assessment of the surplus at stake
We examine the gift exchange hypothesis on both the quantity and quality of work using a hybrid fiel...
We investigate how workers' performance is affected by the timing of wages in a real-effort experime...
We investigate how employee potential influences wage offers and effort exertion in a gift exchange ...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
If paying higher wages motivates individuals to voluntarily provide more effort, this has sweeping i...
The presence of workers who reciprocate higher wages with greater effort can have important conseque...
The presence of workers who reciprocate higher wages with greater effort can have important conseque...
We organize a real-effort field experiment with varying piece rates to assess the impact of wages an...
We investigate the effects of pay comparison information (i.e. information about what coworkers earn...
Abstract: Standard models in labor economics and agency theory assumes that only extrinsic motivatio...
We examine the gift exchange hypothesis on both the quantity and quality of work using a hybrid fiel...
We investigate how workers' performance is affected by the timing of wages in a real-effort experime...
We investigate how employee potential influences wage offers and effort exertion in a gift exchange ...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work ef...
If paying higher wages motivates individuals to voluntarily provide more effort, this has sweeping i...
The presence of workers who reciprocate higher wages with greater effort can have important conseque...
The presence of workers who reciprocate higher wages with greater effort can have important conseque...
We organize a real-effort field experiment with varying piece rates to assess the impact of wages an...
We investigate the effects of pay comparison information (i.e. information about what coworkers earn...
Abstract: Standard models in labor economics and agency theory assumes that only extrinsic motivatio...
We examine the gift exchange hypothesis on both the quantity and quality of work using a hybrid fiel...
We investigate how workers' performance is affected by the timing of wages in a real-effort experime...
We investigate how employee potential influences wage offers and effort exertion in a gift exchange ...