Add to ORKGThis note corrects an analytical mistake of Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999) in their analysis of a Stackelberg game of the voluntary contribution to an international best−shot public good by a donor and a recipient. It shows that, depending on players ' preferences, the donor may choose not to contribute but make a positive direct income transfer to the recipient who will then contribute to the best−shot public good
The authors develop a theoretical model of foreign aid to analyze a method of disbursement of aid wh...
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repe...
This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establishnpositive contributions to public goods...
WP 1999-05 March 1999In the presence of international public goods, donors are faced with two instru...
Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous...
ABSTRACT. “Goods, Games, and Institutions ” (Aggarwal and Dupont, 1999) models the provision of a pu...
Donor countries have a poor track record of meeting their foreign aid commitments. Yet the discrepan...
This paper aims to provide theoretical insight into the relationship between private voluntary contr...
This paper considers a stylized model where a donor and a recipient government derive utility from a...
Several economists have maintained that social sanctions can enforce cooperation in public good situ...
There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers betw...
Lindahl equilibria are often seen as an ideal outcome of cooperation in a public-goods economy. But ...
Development assistance is increasingly used to fund the provision of global public goods. However, i...
When contributors to a common cause (or, public good) are uncertain about each others ’ valuations, ...
Lindahl equilibria are often seen as an ideal outcome of cooperation in a public-goods economy. But ...
The authors develop a theoretical model of foreign aid to analyze a method of disbursement of aid wh...
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repe...
This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establishnpositive contributions to public goods...
WP 1999-05 March 1999In the presence of international public goods, donors are faced with two instru...
Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous...
ABSTRACT. “Goods, Games, and Institutions ” (Aggarwal and Dupont, 1999) models the provision of a pu...
Donor countries have a poor track record of meeting their foreign aid commitments. Yet the discrepan...
This paper aims to provide theoretical insight into the relationship between private voluntary contr...
This paper considers a stylized model where a donor and a recipient government derive utility from a...
Several economists have maintained that social sanctions can enforce cooperation in public good situ...
There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers betw...
Lindahl equilibria are often seen as an ideal outcome of cooperation in a public-goods economy. But ...
Development assistance is increasingly used to fund the provision of global public goods. However, i...
When contributors to a common cause (or, public good) are uncertain about each others ’ valuations, ...
Lindahl equilibria are often seen as an ideal outcome of cooperation in a public-goods economy. But ...
The authors develop a theoretical model of foreign aid to analyze a method of disbursement of aid wh...
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repe...
This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establishnpositive contributions to public goods...