Resource rentals can be viewed as taxes on scarcity rents or as fees for access to use or utilize the resource. The Icelandic Fishery Management Act requires that vessel owners pay a Catch fee (Veiðigjald). This paper discusses how the Catch fee is defined by the Fishery Management Act. Secondly it is discussed if and how the fee affects incentives. Thirdly a alternative method of taxing the resource rental is commented briefly upon. Lastly it is asked if the fee is high enough. <P> Keywords: Rsource Rentals, fishing fee, ITQs, Icelandic fishery managemen
Research PaperFisheries economists have studied fisheries managed with ITQs and compared them to fis...
Research PaperTraditional fisheries management schemes provide fishermen with incentives to maximise...
This study uses the National Accounts and the definitions of the UN System of Environmental-Economic...
Suggested Bibliographic Reference: Challenging New Frontiers in the Global Seafood Sector: Proceedin...
This master thesis is about the resource rent and taxation of resource rent in Norwegian fisheries a...
A traditional fisheries management scheme generates incentives to maximize a vessels share of the ca...
A traditional fisheries management scheme generates incentives to maximize a vessels share of the ca...
The difference between the concepts of profit and rent are discussed theoretically and by using aggr...
This master thesis is about the resource rent and taxation of resource rent in Norwegian fisheries ...
Research by J.D. Sachs and A.M. Warner, indicates that resource-rich countries are less successful i...
Property rights and economic performance have been highly linked concepts, where the former influenc...
presentationTo run the ITQ system as well as other components of the fisheries management system, th...
The article debates the origin of rent in natural-resource based industries (NRBIs) such as fisherie...
A major issue in resource economics is the capture of economic rent. In fisheries, in contrast to n...
A major issue in resource economics is the capture of economic rent. In fisheries, in contrast to n...
Research PaperFisheries economists have studied fisheries managed with ITQs and compared them to fis...
Research PaperTraditional fisheries management schemes provide fishermen with incentives to maximise...
This study uses the National Accounts and the definitions of the UN System of Environmental-Economic...
Suggested Bibliographic Reference: Challenging New Frontiers in the Global Seafood Sector: Proceedin...
This master thesis is about the resource rent and taxation of resource rent in Norwegian fisheries a...
A traditional fisheries management scheme generates incentives to maximize a vessels share of the ca...
A traditional fisheries management scheme generates incentives to maximize a vessels share of the ca...
The difference between the concepts of profit and rent are discussed theoretically and by using aggr...
This master thesis is about the resource rent and taxation of resource rent in Norwegian fisheries ...
Research by J.D. Sachs and A.M. Warner, indicates that resource-rich countries are less successful i...
Property rights and economic performance have been highly linked concepts, where the former influenc...
presentationTo run the ITQ system as well as other components of the fisheries management system, th...
The article debates the origin of rent in natural-resource based industries (NRBIs) such as fisherie...
A major issue in resource economics is the capture of economic rent. In fisheries, in contrast to n...
A major issue in resource economics is the capture of economic rent. In fisheries, in contrast to n...
Research PaperFisheries economists have studied fisheries managed with ITQs and compared them to fis...
Research PaperTraditional fisheries management schemes provide fishermen with incentives to maximise...
This study uses the National Accounts and the definitions of the UN System of Environmental-Economic...