A Theory of Ethics for Forensic Psychiatry

This article offers a justification for a set of principles that constitute the ethical underpinnings of forensic psychiatry. Like professional ethics in general, the principles are based on the particular societal functions performed by forensic psychiatrists and result in the intensification of obligations to promote certain important moral values. For forensic psychiatrists, the primary value of their work is to advance the interests of justice. The two principles on which that effort rests are truth-telling and respect for persons. In the same manner as other physicians who perform functions outside of the usual clinical context (e.g., clinical research-ers), forensic psychiatrists cannot simply rely on general medical ethics, embed-ded as they are in the doctor-patient relationship-which is absent in the forensic setting. Indeed, efforts to retain some residuum of that relationship and its asso-ciated ethical principles are likely to create confusion in the minds of both forensic psychiatrists and their evaluees and to heighten the problems of double agency. A virtue of this approach is the clear distinction it offers between clinical and forensic roles. 111 1982, at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law (AAPL), Alan Stone posed a stark challenge to the moral legitimacy of fo-rensic psychiatry. ' Casting a skeptical eye on the ethical principles forensic psy-chiatrists might use to guide their behav-ior, Stone rejected them all. The compet