A dominant, net buyer of a certain asset receives a private signal that is correlated with its mean value. We call this insider a Boesky Insider when the quality of the received signal is such that the future value of the asset can be predicted with certainty. We show that even an infinitesimal probability of a Boesky Insider results in informational inefficiency of prices. Insisting that the equilibrium be continuous in the signal accentuates the inefficiency to the extent that no information is conveyed. The informational inefficiency not withstanding, the regime that allows insider trading can result in greater liquidity and is, in an ex-ante sense, Pareto superior when compared to a regime in which insider trading is banned. JEL CLASSIF...
In this paper, we consider a security market in which two investors on different information levels ...
The continuous-time version of Kyle’s (Econometrica 53(6):1315–1336, 1985 ) model of asset pricing w...
Few issues have sparked as much debate and disagreement among Law and Economics scholars as the proh...
A dominant, net buyer of a certain asset receives a private signal that is correlated with its mean ...
A mean-variance Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium model is extended to an economy in which tra...
It is often argued that efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading. ...
The single auction equilibrium of Kyle's (1985) is studied, in which noise traders may be partially ...
A one period model of a speculative market is analyzed in which a monopolistically privately informe...
We compare equilibrium trading outcomes with and without participation by an informed insider, assum...
We consider an equilibrium model \ue0 la Kyle-Back for a defaultable claim issued by a given firm. I...
We consider an equilibrium model á la Kyle-Back for a defaultable claim issued by a given firm. In s...
We study a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium model of insider trading in continuous time. The supply of the ...
We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned 'monopo...
A model of insider trading in continuous time in which a risk-neutral insider possesses long-lived i...
Kyle (1985) builds a pioneering and influential model, in which an insider with long-lived private i...
In this paper, we consider a security market in which two investors on different information levels ...
The continuous-time version of Kyle’s (Econometrica 53(6):1315–1336, 1985 ) model of asset pricing w...
Few issues have sparked as much debate and disagreement among Law and Economics scholars as the proh...
A dominant, net buyer of a certain asset receives a private signal that is correlated with its mean ...
A mean-variance Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium model is extended to an economy in which tra...
It is often argued that efficiency considerations require society to freely permit insider trading. ...
The single auction equilibrium of Kyle's (1985) is studied, in which noise traders may be partially ...
A one period model of a speculative market is analyzed in which a monopolistically privately informe...
We compare equilibrium trading outcomes with and without participation by an informed insider, assum...
We consider an equilibrium model \ue0 la Kyle-Back for a defaultable claim issued by a given firm. I...
We consider an equilibrium model á la Kyle-Back for a defaultable claim issued by a given firm. In s...
We study a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium model of insider trading in continuous time. The supply of the ...
We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned 'monopo...
A model of insider trading in continuous time in which a risk-neutral insider possesses long-lived i...
Kyle (1985) builds a pioneering and influential model, in which an insider with long-lived private i...
In this paper, we consider a security market in which two investors on different information levels ...
The continuous-time version of Kyle’s (Econometrica 53(6):1315–1336, 1985 ) model of asset pricing w...
Few issues have sparked as much debate and disagreement among Law and Economics scholars as the proh...