doi:10.1093/mind/fzi1135 © Schiffer 2005 Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions

The proper statement and assessment of Russell’s theory depends on one’s semantic presuppositions. A semantic framework is provided, and Russell’s theory formulated in terms of it. Referential uses of descriptions raise familiar problems for the theory, to which there are, at the most general level of abstraction, two possible Russellian responses. Both are considered, and both found wanting. The paper ends with a brief consideration of what the correct positive theory of definite descriptions might be, if it is not the Russellian theory. The theory of definite descriptions Bertrand Russell presented in ‘On Denoting ’ one hundred years ago was instrumental in defining the then newly emerging philosophy of language, but a more remarkable achievement is that this centenarian theory is the currently dominant theory of definite descriptions. But what, exactly, is this theory? The question needs to be asked because the theory Russell presented in 1905 is not acceptable in the form in which he then stated it, and while we have little trouble in deciding whether a theory of definite description