Add to ORKGAll in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately
International audienceCollusion sustainability depends on firms' ability to impose sufficiently seve...
In the context of principal-agent theory risk is largely seen as a source that causes ine ¢ ciencies...
Many economic situations arise in which several principals contract with the same agents sequentiall...
We discuss two incentive schemes that are frequently used in practice—tournaments and piece rates. T...
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004The existing literature on t...
This paper characterizes the optimal way for a principal to structure a rank-order tournament in a m...
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured ...
Tournaments have been objected as resulting from ad hoc restrictions to the contracting problem whic...
Optimal rank-order tournaments have traditionally been studied using a first-order approach. The pre...
The optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are (ex post) limita...
This paper compares relative performance evaluation via tournaments to absolute performance evaluati...
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the design of monitoring schemes in competitive rank-or...
AbstractOptimal rank-order tournaments have traditionally been studied using a first-order approach....
Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. Wh...
This paper studies incentive provision with limited punishments. It revisits the moral hazard proble...
International audienceCollusion sustainability depends on firms' ability to impose sufficiently seve...
In the context of principal-agent theory risk is largely seen as a source that causes ine ¢ ciencies...
Many economic situations arise in which several principals contract with the same agents sequentiall...
We discuss two incentive schemes that are frequently used in practice—tournaments and piece rates. T...
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004The existing literature on t...
This paper characterizes the optimal way for a principal to structure a rank-order tournament in a m...
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents’ performance is measured ...
Tournaments have been objected as resulting from ad hoc restrictions to the contracting problem whic...
Optimal rank-order tournaments have traditionally been studied using a first-order approach. The pre...
The optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are (ex post) limita...
This paper compares relative performance evaluation via tournaments to absolute performance evaluati...
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the design of monitoring schemes in competitive rank-or...
AbstractOptimal rank-order tournaments have traditionally been studied using a first-order approach....
Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. Wh...
This paper studies incentive provision with limited punishments. It revisits the moral hazard proble...
International audienceCollusion sustainability depends on firms' ability to impose sufficiently seve...
In the context of principal-agent theory risk is largely seen as a source that causes ine ¢ ciencies...
Many economic situations arise in which several principals contract with the same agents sequentiall...