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In the Categories, Aristotle recognizes two relations that an entity can bear to a subject: it can either inhere in or be said-of a subject. In this dissertation, I offer an interpretation of the natures of these relations and their relata. I also examine Aristotle’s views about predication, the nature of truthmakers, and ontological priority. At Categories 1a24-25, Aristotle offers a definition of inherence which, on the most natural reading, holds that a nonsubstance can inhere in a substance only if it cannot exist without that substance. An entity that inheres in a particular substance must be a nonsubstantial particular which is numerically distinct from any entity that inheres in a distinct substance. This reading of 1a24-25, however, is inconsistent with the most natural reading of Aristotle’s claim 2a34ff that the universal color must inhere in a particular body. To render Aristotle’s claims consistent, we must reinterpret either 1a24-25 or 2a34ff. In chapters 2-6, I show that various attempts to reinterpret these passages are not successful. I argue that Aristotle’s claims really are inconsistent. In chapters 7-10, I consider what might have led Aristotle to this inconsistency. I conclude tha