The paper analyzes an infinite-horizon sequential bargaining game (with one-sided offers) between a buyer and a seller when the buyer's valuation depends on the seller's; the seller knows the value of the object and the buyer does not. The influence of relative discount factors on the solution is studied. It is shown, for example, that an impasse may result if the buyer (offeror) is too impatient relative to the seller: the buyer makes a single take-it-or-Ieave-it offer
This paper analyzes an alternating offer model of bargaining over the sale of an asset in a market, ...
The uniqueness of equilibrium in bargaining games with three or more players is a problem preventing...
International audienceIn this paper we test some hypotheses about the formation of prices through se...
A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect si...
A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect si...
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and com-monly valued ...
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued o...
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued o...
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued o...
We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete inf...
A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in reaching mutu...
We investigate an infinite horizon two-person simultaneous move bargaining game with incomplete info...
This paper analyzes an alternating offer model of bargaining over the sale of an asset in a market, ...
textabstractI study a sequential process in which different pairs of traders bargain over the terms ...
Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are sel...
This paper analyzes an alternating offer model of bargaining over the sale of an asset in a market, ...
The uniqueness of equilibrium in bargaining games with three or more players is a problem preventing...
International audienceIn this paper we test some hypotheses about the formation of prices through se...
A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect si...
A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect si...
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and com-monly valued ...
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued o...
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued o...
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued o...
We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete inf...
A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in reaching mutu...
We investigate an infinite horizon two-person simultaneous move bargaining game with incomplete info...
This paper analyzes an alternating offer model of bargaining over the sale of an asset in a market, ...
textabstractI study a sequential process in which different pairs of traders bargain over the terms ...
Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are sel...
This paper analyzes an alternating offer model of bargaining over the sale of an asset in a market, ...
The uniqueness of equilibrium in bargaining games with three or more players is a problem preventing...
International audienceIn this paper we test some hypotheses about the formation of prices through se...
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