Computational Models of Trust for Cooperative Evolution Reputation Based Game Theoretic Models of Trust for Cooperative Evolution in online Business Games

Online services such as e-marketplaces, social networking sites, online gaming environments etc have grown in popularity in the recent years. These services represent situation where participants do not get to negotiate face to face before interaction and most of the time parties to transaction remain anonymous. It is thus necessary to have a system that rightly assesses trustworthiness of the other party in order to maintain quality assurance in such systems. Recent works on Trust and Reputation in online communities have focused on identifying probable defaulters, but less effort has been put to come up with system that make cooperation attractive over defection in order to achieve cooperation without enforcement. Our work in this regard concerns design and investigation of trust assessment systems that not only filter defaulters but also promote evolution of cooperativeness in player society. Based on the concept of game theory and prisoner‟s dilemma, we model business games and design incentive method, compensation method