In a management buyout (MBO) offer, managers have an incentive to offer stockholders a price low enough to compensate them for the risks of increasing their equity ownership in a highly leveraged buyout firm. As these risks increase, managers are more likely to combine their offer with an anti-takeover measure. These measures do not protect a low offer, but do result in a higher takeover price when managers are unwilling to match a competitive offer. Such measures
This paper investigates the stock price reaction of some pre-management buyout (MBO) investment deci...
Discussion regarding the necessity of management buyouts as the basis of corporate-governance theory...
This paper offers a new explanation of value-reducing mergers and stock market driven takeovers by i...
In a management buyout (MBO) offer, managers have an incentive to offer stockholders a price low eno...
In a management buyout (MBO) offer, managers have an incentive to offer stockholders a price low eno...
In an MBO contest, managers offer to buy the firm from public shareholders at a premium to the curre...
Managers are risk averse. Excessive risk-aversion can destroy shareholder wealth. A key source of ri...
International audienceA management buyout (MBO) is a form of transaction in which management teams a...
How do shareholders perceive managers who lever up under a takeover threat? Increasing leverage conv...
The central question of this study involves the relation between the use of takeover defenses and IP...
The central question of this study involves the relation between the use of takeover defences and IP...
This paper examines the change in management’s dollar investment in the firm around leveraged buyout...
Abstract: To address the question as to whether managers manipulate accounting numbers downwards pri...
This paper adopts the mid-1990s Delaware antitakeover regime shift as a natural experiment to examin...
We analyze the impact of takeover threats on long term relationships between the target owners and o...
This paper investigates the stock price reaction of some pre-management buyout (MBO) investment deci...
Discussion regarding the necessity of management buyouts as the basis of corporate-governance theory...
This paper offers a new explanation of value-reducing mergers and stock market driven takeovers by i...
In a management buyout (MBO) offer, managers have an incentive to offer stockholders a price low eno...
In a management buyout (MBO) offer, managers have an incentive to offer stockholders a price low eno...
In an MBO contest, managers offer to buy the firm from public shareholders at a premium to the curre...
Managers are risk averse. Excessive risk-aversion can destroy shareholder wealth. A key source of ri...
International audienceA management buyout (MBO) is a form of transaction in which management teams a...
How do shareholders perceive managers who lever up under a takeover threat? Increasing leverage conv...
The central question of this study involves the relation between the use of takeover defenses and IP...
The central question of this study involves the relation between the use of takeover defences and IP...
This paper examines the change in management’s dollar investment in the firm around leveraged buyout...
Abstract: To address the question as to whether managers manipulate accounting numbers downwards pri...
This paper adopts the mid-1990s Delaware antitakeover regime shift as a natural experiment to examin...
We analyze the impact of takeover threats on long term relationships between the target owners and o...
This paper investigates the stock price reaction of some pre-management buyout (MBO) investment deci...
Discussion regarding the necessity of management buyouts as the basis of corporate-governance theory...
This paper offers a new explanation of value-reducing mergers and stock market driven takeovers by i...