Chapter 5 Why the Received Models of Considering Preference Change Must Fail

Abstract First, the paper discusses the extent to which preference change is a topic of normative rationality; it confirms as one main issue the economists ' search for a rational decision rule in cases in which the agent himself envisages to have chan ging / • preferences. Then it introduces so-called global decision models and shows that all the received economic models for dealing with preference change have that shape. The final seetion states two examples for global decision models, one with extrinsic, belief-induced and one with intrinsic preference change, and interprets each of them in two different scenarios in which ditlerent strategies are intuitively reasonable-the point being that global decision models cannot provide sufficient information for stating adequate decision rules. What the missing information might be is at least indicated at the end. In this brief paper I want to give a specific argument for the title thesis. It is an entirely negative one, as far as it goes, unless one says it is positive to know how not to do things. A really positive treatment of the issue is, as far as I see, a very demanding and involved and as yet untold story. I The title thesis seems ill expressed; either "of " or "considering " should be deleted. This would be an error, though. In order to understand why we have to briefly and generally discuss in which way preference change could be a philosoph-ical topic at all; this is the task of Seetion 5.1. Having thus identified our topic, i.e., models of considering preference change, Seetion 5.2 introduces local and global decision models, as I call them, and explains that the latter are the received way of dealing with considering preference change. Section 5.3, finally, puts forward my negative argument: global decision models do not contain all items or distinctions that are intuitively required for rational decisions facing preference change