In rst-price auctions with interdependent bidder values, the distributions of private signals and values cannot be uniquely recovered from bids in Bayesian Nash equilibria. Non-identi cation invalidates structural analyses that rely on the exact knowledge of model primitives. In this paper I introduce tight, informative bounds on the distribution of revenues in counterfactual \u85rst-price and second-price auctions with binding reserve prices. These robust bounds are identi\u85ed from distributions of equilibrium bids in \u85rst-price auctions under minimal restrictions where I allow for a ¢ liated signals and both private- and common-value paradigms. The bounds can be used to compare auction formats and to select optimal reserve prices. I ...
I study the design of auctions in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about the...
We study how the outcomes of a private-value first price auction can vary with bidders’ information, ...
Two features common to many auctions are the use of reserve prices and the existence of secondary ma...
Sponsored search auctions are the main source of revenue for search engines. In such an auction, a s...
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetri...
In private-value ascending auctions, the winner's willingness to pay is not observed, leading to und...
Until now the optimal reserve price in the independent private value paradigm has been expressed as...
We study how the outcomes of a private-value \u85rst price auction can vary with bidders information...
We study the impact of public and secret reserve prices in auctions where buyers have independent p...
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06This dissertation contributes to the structural auc...
We study the Price of Anarchy of simultaneous First-Price auctions for buyers with sub-modular and s...
We analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are types of bidders whos...
We study optimal public and secret reserve prices for risk averse sellers in second price auctions w...
In a general auction model in which bidders' signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique...
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions in which bidders...
I study the design of auctions in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about the...
We study how the outcomes of a private-value first price auction can vary with bidders’ information, ...
Two features common to many auctions are the use of reserve prices and the existence of secondary ma...
Sponsored search auctions are the main source of revenue for search engines. In such an auction, a s...
We explore the impact of private information in sealed-bid first-price auctions. For a given symmetri...
In private-value ascending auctions, the winner's willingness to pay is not observed, leading to und...
Until now the optimal reserve price in the independent private value paradigm has been expressed as...
We study how the outcomes of a private-value \u85rst price auction can vary with bidders information...
We study the impact of public and secret reserve prices in auctions where buyers have independent p...
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06This dissertation contributes to the structural auc...
We study the Price of Anarchy of simultaneous First-Price auctions for buyers with sub-modular and s...
We analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are types of bidders whos...
We study optimal public and secret reserve prices for risk averse sellers in second price auctions w...
In a general auction model in which bidders' signals are affiliated, we characterize the unique...
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions in which bidders...
I study the design of auctions in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about the...
We study how the outcomes of a private-value first price auction can vary with bidders’ information, ...
Two features common to many auctions are the use of reserve prices and the existence of secondary ma...