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In this dissertation, I describe two studies related to investors ’ perceptions about management disclosures. In the first study, I use a variant of Dye and Sridhar (2004) to show analytically that investor uncertainty about managers ’ reporting incentives to manipulate information reduces the degree to which accounting reports should weight manipulable information. I also predict and show experimentally that greater weight on manipulable information in the face of incentive uncertainty harms investor welfare more than predicted by equilibrium analyses, by hindering managers ’ and investors’ ability to predict one another’s strategies. The resulting deviations from equilibrium cause the perceived and actual value-relevance of financial reports to vary over time in predictable (and testable) ways. In the second study, I report an experiment that examines how investor affect might influence investors ’ perceptions of management disclosure credibility. Based on accounting and psychology literature, I predict that investors in a positive affective state will assess a higher level of management disclosure credibility due to positiv