Add to ORKGAbstract. In a typical participating life insurance contract, the insurance company is en-titled to a share of the return surplus as compensation for the return guarantee granted to policyholders. This call-option-like stake gives the insurance company an incentive to increase the riskiness of its investments at the expense of the policyholders. The conflict of interests can partially be solved by regulation deterring the insurance company from taking excessive risk. In a utility-based framework where default is modeled continuously by a structural approach, we show that a flexible design of regulatory supervision can be beneficial for both the policyholder and the insurance company
Limited liability creates an incentive for insurers to increase the risk of the assets and liabiliti...
The economic reasons for life insurance regulation have not been well developed in the finance liter...
Corporate limited liability creates incentives for owners to shift risks onto creditors by substitut...
Abstract. In a typical participating life insurance contract, the insurance company is enti-tled to ...
Limited liability creates a conflict of interests between policyholders and shareholders of insuranc...
Traditional life insurance policies in many markets are sold with minimum interest rate guarantees. ...
[[abstract]]Purpose – This paper aims to theoretically examine the effects of regulatory policyholde...
I assess how Basel III, Solvency II and the low interest rate environment will affect the financial ...
This paper analyzes the numerical impact of different surplus distribution mechanisms on the risk ex...
In this paper we study how policyholders and equityholders contribute to the formation of a life ins...
The economic reasons for life insurance regulation have not been well developed in the finance liter...
The aim of this paper is to investigate optimal combinations of risk management mechanisms and prici...
In this paper, we provide a new insight to the previous work of Briys and de Varenne [1994], Grosen ...
Traditional participating life insurance contracts with year-to-year (cliquet-style) guarantees have...
This paper takes a contingent claim approach to the market valuation of equity and liabilities in li...
Limited liability creates an incentive for insurers to increase the risk of the assets and liabiliti...
The economic reasons for life insurance regulation have not been well developed in the finance liter...
Corporate limited liability creates incentives for owners to shift risks onto creditors by substitut...
Abstract. In a typical participating life insurance contract, the insurance company is enti-tled to ...
Limited liability creates a conflict of interests between policyholders and shareholders of insuranc...
Traditional life insurance policies in many markets are sold with minimum interest rate guarantees. ...
[[abstract]]Purpose – This paper aims to theoretically examine the effects of regulatory policyholde...
I assess how Basel III, Solvency II and the low interest rate environment will affect the financial ...
This paper analyzes the numerical impact of different surplus distribution mechanisms on the risk ex...
In this paper we study how policyholders and equityholders contribute to the formation of a life ins...
The economic reasons for life insurance regulation have not been well developed in the finance liter...
The aim of this paper is to investigate optimal combinations of risk management mechanisms and prici...
In this paper, we provide a new insight to the previous work of Briys and de Varenne [1994], Grosen ...
Traditional participating life insurance contracts with year-to-year (cliquet-style) guarantees have...
This paper takes a contingent claim approach to the market valuation of equity and liabilities in li...
Limited liability creates an incentive for insurers to increase the risk of the assets and liabiliti...
The economic reasons for life insurance regulation have not been well developed in the finance liter...
Corporate limited liability creates incentives for owners to shift risks onto creditors by substitut...