For those interested in the mechanisms of conjugal separation, the article by Cécile Bourreau-Dubois and Myriam Doriat-Duban, based on purely theoretical concepts of orthodox economics, may appear somewhat disconnected from reality. The authors ask, for example, whether divorce is an exogenous risk – a random event independent of the will of the partners – or endogenous – tied to the partners’ decisions, including their potentially “incautious” behaviour: “They can act upon the probability of divorce, for example by being faithful and attentive to the other or investing in the household” (p. 462). As sociologists working on the legal aspects of conjugal separations (Collectif Onze, 2013), we believe that it is essential to lay down the abun...
Divorce law provides the framework that governs the circumstances under which a marriage may be brou...
Contains fulltext : 63699.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)We examine the s...
It is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce impli cit marital contracts by "voice....
As with many life events, divorce is a subject for discussion and debate involving a broad range of ...
This article explores key insights that economic theory can shed on the issue of no-fault divorce in...
Why do people get married? Love, sex, children, money. Why do they get divorced? Probably for the sa...
Chapter one: a theory of rational marriage and divorce . The decisions to marry and, possibly, to di...
The Coase Theorem suggests that married couples will divorce if and only if doing so increases their...
Abstract. This article explores key insights that economic theory can shed on the issue of no-fault ...
In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially...
The first chapter develops a theoretical model of marriage and divorce. The model has two periods an...
The article is an attempt to summarize theoretical conception and empirical research on divorce fro...
The Coase Theorem suggests that married couples will divorce if and only if doing so increases their...
This paper revisits the issue of the unilateral divorce law, taking into account that: 1/ the decisi...
Chapter 1: Specialization, marriage gains and divorce risk. This chapter presents a two-period barga...
Divorce law provides the framework that governs the circumstances under which a marriage may be brou...
Contains fulltext : 63699.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)We examine the s...
It is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce impli cit marital contracts by "voice....
As with many life events, divorce is a subject for discussion and debate involving a broad range of ...
This article explores key insights that economic theory can shed on the issue of no-fault divorce in...
Why do people get married? Love, sex, children, money. Why do they get divorced? Probably for the sa...
Chapter one: a theory of rational marriage and divorce . The decisions to marry and, possibly, to di...
The Coase Theorem suggests that married couples will divorce if and only if doing so increases their...
Abstract. This article explores key insights that economic theory can shed on the issue of no-fault ...
In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially...
The first chapter develops a theoretical model of marriage and divorce. The model has two periods an...
The article is an attempt to summarize theoretical conception and empirical research on divorce fro...
The Coase Theorem suggests that married couples will divorce if and only if doing so increases their...
This paper revisits the issue of the unilateral divorce law, taking into account that: 1/ the decisi...
Chapter 1: Specialization, marriage gains and divorce risk. This chapter presents a two-period barga...
Divorce law provides the framework that governs the circumstances under which a marriage may be brou...
Contains fulltext : 63699.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)We examine the s...
It is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce impli cit marital contracts by "voice....