PROCEEDINGS of the HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOCIETY 42nd ANNUAL MEETING-1998 201 AUTOMATION BIAS AND ERRORS: ARE TEAMS BETTER THAN INDIVIDUALS?

A series of recent studies has identified two classes of errors that commonly emerge in highly automated decision environments: (1) omission errors, defined as failures to respond to system irregularities or events because automated devices fail to detect or indicate them; and (2) commission errors, which occur when people incorrectly follow an automated directive or recommendation, without verifying it against other available information, or in spite of contra-indications from other sources of information. These errors are hypothesized to be the result of “automation bias, ” the use of automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing. Two concurrent studies, using students and professional pilots as participants, demonstrated the persistence of automation bias in crews compared with solo performers, despite display enhancements and explicit training to verify automated functioning. Training that focused on automation bias and associated errors successfully reduced omission errors in students. Pilot performance during the experimental egs was most highly predicted by performance on the control leg and by event importance. The previously found “phantom memory” phenomenon associated with a false engine fire event persisted in crews. Automation Bias A series of recent studies has identified two classes of errors that commonly emerge in highly automated decision environments: (1) omission errors, defined as failures to respond to system irregularities or events because automated devices fail to detect or indicate them; and (2) commission errors, which occur when people incorrectly follow an automated directive or recommendation, without verifying it against other available information, or in spite of contra-indications from other sources o