Pricing Ad Slots with Consecutive Multi-unit Demand

Abstract. We consider the optimal pricing problem for a model of the rich media advertisement market, as well as other related applications. In this market, there are multiple buyers (advertisers), and items (slots) that are arranged in a line such as a banner on a website. Each buyer desires a particular number of consecutive slots and has a per-unit-quality value vi (dependent on the ad only) while each slot j has a quality qj (dependent on the position only such as click-through rate in position auctions). Hence, the valuation of the buyer i for item j is viqj. We want to decide the allocations and the prices in order to maximize the total revenue of the market maker. A key difference from the traditional position auction is the advertiser’s requirement of a fixed number of consecutive slots. Consecutive slots may be needed for a large size rich media ad. We study three major pricing mechanisms, the Bayesian pricing model, the maximum revenue market equilibrium model and envy-free solution model. Under the Bayesian model, we design a polynomial time computable truthful mechanism which is optimum in revenue. For the market equilibrium paradigm, we find a polynomial time algorithm to obtain the maximum revenue market equilibrium solution. In envy-free settings, an optimal solution is presented when the buyers have the same demand. We present a sim-ulation that compares the revenues from the above schemes and gives convincing results