This paper poses a puzzle concerning a broadly held view about normative reasons for belief: evidentialism. Evidentialism is the highly intuitive view that the only normative reasons for belief are evidential reasons. I shall argue that in certai
This chapter explores the relationship between reasons and epistemic rationality. In recent debates ...
In this chapter, we critically examine the most important extant ways of understanding and motivatin...
This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis con...
In this paper I introduce an objection to normative evidentialism about reasons for belief. The obje...
This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with t...
peer reviewedThis paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bi...
In this thesis, I raise considerations against some arguments that support evidentialism, the view t...
Evidentialism is the thesis that all reasons to believe p are evidence for p. Pragmatists hold that ...
In this paper I argue that Evidentialism is unsatisfactory as a general account of epistemic justifi...
Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particul...
It is plausible that there are epistemic reasons bearing on a distinctively epistemic standard of co...
Abstract Many stored beliefs, like beliefs in one's personal data or beliefs in one's area...
This chapter explores the relationship between reasons and epistemic rationality. In recent debates ...
In this chapter, we critically examine the most important extant ways of understanding and motivatin...
This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis con...
In this paper I introduce an objection to normative evidentialism about reasons for belief. The obje...
This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with t...
peer reviewedThis paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bi...
In this thesis, I raise considerations against some arguments that support evidentialism, the view t...
Evidentialism is the thesis that all reasons to believe p are evidence for p. Pragmatists hold that ...
In this paper I argue that Evidentialism is unsatisfactory as a general account of epistemic justifi...
Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particul...
It is plausible that there are epistemic reasons bearing on a distinctively epistemic standard of co...
Abstract Many stored beliefs, like beliefs in one's personal data or beliefs in one's area...
This chapter explores the relationship between reasons and epistemic rationality. In recent debates ...
In this chapter, we critically examine the most important extant ways of understanding and motivatin...
This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis con...