Industrial Relations Theory

The American labor movement is in a state of decline. Whether measured by the percent of the labor force under union contract, the popularity of unions among non-unionized workers, the number of new certification elections won, or the pay and benefit levels of currently employed unionized workers, unions are weaker today than at any time since the late 1920s. Unionization rates have plummeted from roughly one-third of the labor force in the early 1950s to less than one-fifth today (Hills 1985). Similarly, willingness to join a union is down from over 50 percent of the non-unionized workforce in the mid-1950s to about 25 percent in the early 1980s (Hills 1985). Unions are only winning about 46 percent of certification elections, compared to 60 percent in the 1950s (Ferguson and Rogers 1979). Finally, unions have been forced to go along with a series of give backs and contract concessions that have left their membership angry and deeply divided.1 Considerable debate has centered around the causes of this decline. Some have attributed it to labor’s conservatism, some to its radicalism; some have looked to broad social forces and long term structural changes, others to situational factors; and some have prescribed remedies, while others have written obituaries. This paper explores this debate through an examination of the empiri-cal and theoretical explanations of union decline. Two major approaches to this topic will be discussed. The first grows out of the work of industrial relations scholars and is highly empirical in its orientation. The second, more sociological approach, while not as empirically rich as industrial relations theory, is more comprehensive and theoretically sophisticated. Following a discussion and evaluation of these perspectives, we will develop an alternative explanation of union decline- one which empha-sizes political relations of power and domination