UNION WAGE GAINS UNDER REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY

"rmamf4 This paper uses wage evidence to investigate the ability of the Teamsters Union to capture a share of regulatory rents in the trucking industry. Previous work has documented the existence of monopoly rerits in the motor carrier industry, and has linked these to economic regulation of the industry by the Interstate Cotrinei-ce Commission (ICC).l However, there has been relatively little economic analysis of thie Teamsters ' role in the trucking industry.' ^ This is a potentially serious oversight; the Teamsters have been a powerful force in the industry, and been perhaps as influential as ICC regulation in determining the performance of trucking firms. In addition, an investigation of union behavior in this industry may yield insights relevant to other regulated markets. The interaction of unionization and regulation was explored briefly by Hendricks (1975), with respect to electric utilities. The trucking industry is a fertile ground for evaluating potential interactions, due to the strength of both the union and regulatory protection. The study analyzes labor market data to determine union losses resulting from motor carrier deregulation. I estimate union wage premia over the 1973 through 1984 period, based on data from the Current Population Survey. Because the data span the period before and after trucking deregulation, they can be used to examine the response of union wage differentials to regulatory reform. This provides evidence o