Add to ORKGABSTRACT: Following Voigt and Salzberger (2002) this paper considers the tradeoff between international and domestic delegation devices, and argues that the two are largely complements rather than substitutes. It then explores the domestic separation of powers as an explanatory factor in understanding different levels of international delegation across states. It argues that the domestic separation of powers is a driving factor in propensity to delegate, and provides some empirical evidence in this regard. Federal states and those with bicameral legislatures are more likely to sign treaties and join international organizations. Presidential systems, however, are no more likely to do so than parliamentary ones
This article provides new insights into size variation of national delegations to plenary meetings o...
Alter highlights the diverse nature of international delegations to courts. She argues that the role...
Why do some countries send big delegations to multilateral negotiations, whereas others send very s...
Koremenos demonstrates that international delegation is an important and nontrivial empirical phenom...
Does the continuing assignment of legislative power to international institutions like the WTO, NAFT...
Over the past five decades, extensive cooperation has persisted among the industrial countries. Most...
This article defines and clarifies the concept of international delegation from both a legal and a s...
Siegel argues that the relationship between an international delegation and the values thought to be...
If international agreements are a product of rational design by states, the underlying cooperation p...
Hathaway rebuts the claim that state sovereignty almost always suffers when states delegate authorit...
International audienceWe consider as endogenous the choice of the delegation rule in an internationa...
We conceive authority of an international organization as latent in two independent dimensions: dele...
A prominent criticism of United States delegations to international institutions—or international de...
Governance delegation agreements-international treaties allowing external actors legal authority wit...
Why do some states have a seemingly easy path to joining international organizations while other sta...
This article provides new insights into size variation of national delegations to plenary meetings o...
Alter highlights the diverse nature of international delegations to courts. She argues that the role...
Why do some countries send big delegations to multilateral negotiations, whereas others send very s...
Koremenos demonstrates that international delegation is an important and nontrivial empirical phenom...
Does the continuing assignment of legislative power to international institutions like the WTO, NAFT...
Over the past five decades, extensive cooperation has persisted among the industrial countries. Most...
This article defines and clarifies the concept of international delegation from both a legal and a s...
Siegel argues that the relationship between an international delegation and the values thought to be...
If international agreements are a product of rational design by states, the underlying cooperation p...
Hathaway rebuts the claim that state sovereignty almost always suffers when states delegate authorit...
International audienceWe consider as endogenous the choice of the delegation rule in an internationa...
We conceive authority of an international organization as latent in two independent dimensions: dele...
A prominent criticism of United States delegations to international institutions—or international de...
Governance delegation agreements-international treaties allowing external actors legal authority wit...
Why do some states have a seemingly easy path to joining international organizations while other sta...
This article provides new insights into size variation of national delegations to plenary meetings o...
Alter highlights the diverse nature of international delegations to courts. She argues that the role...
Why do some countries send big delegations to multilateral negotiations, whereas others send very s...