The Appearance of War in Discourse: An Analysis of the Neoconservative Movement

The YCISS Working Paper Series is designed to stimulate feedback from other experts in the field. The series explores topical themes that reflect work being undertaken at the Centre. The term ‘neoconservative ’ is an intriguing one. In his study, Kenneth Zagacki (1996) lays out the main features of1 the neoconservative discourse which emerged in the 1960s. One of these features dealt with how this discourse actively sought to defeat neoliberals and conservatives alike: “Neoconservatives depicted politics as endorsing rational action that promoted the social welfare – less action than liberals but more enlightened action than that proposed by traditional conservatives ” (177). Essentially, they presented themselves as mediators who utilized the best of classic liberalism, conservatism, and the progressive elements of modernity (Ibid: 178-81). In this sense, these neoconservatives are as much progressive liberals as they are conservatives, and hence, the dubiousness of the term ‘neoconservative. ’ For the purposes of this paper, I will not delve into the debate surrounding the term, its obviously Straussian roots, or the current state of its ‘struggle ’ with neoliberalism. These are all extremely important questions, but I wish to first, outline the contours of the discourse within itself. That is, to illustrate the very make up of this discourse and examine how this particular strand of self-proclaimed neoconservatism operates. More specifically, I use the term neoconservative to denote a discourse which presents itself as the neoconservative alternative to the liberal, realist, and isolationist trends in American foreign policy debates. So, what makes a neoco