In Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, Harry Frankfurt put forward a theory that what is essential to be a person is second-order volition. The notion of second-order volition can be used as a key conceptual tool in understanding the conflict between desires. By means of the notion, this paper argues that the conflict between desires in our minds lies in the conflict between second-order volitions, other than the conflict between first-order desires. Based on this claim, this paper suggests that, due to the mis-understanding of the nature of the conflict between desires, the analysis of unwilling addict and wanton addict given by Frankfurt is thus wrong, and in his follow-up articles he made wrong description of the phenomenon ...
In § 6 of his General Psychopathology (1st edition 1913) Jaspers distinguished between drives, wants...
The paper develops two objections to Michael Bratman’s self-governance approach to the normativity o...
In this paper free volitions are construed as a subclass of reflective judgements in the Kantian mea...
ABSTRACT: In this article I look at some the issues, problems and (it seems to me) self-imposed dile...
In philosophy of mind, desire is an also-ran when it comes to theorizing about mental states- all th...
This paper is an attempt to come to a better understanding of desire through an examination of certa...
Harry Frankfurt has published On Inequality, but this is not the first time he has written about thi...
In this paper I integrate the work of a number of philosophers to clarify some psychological issues ...
In this paper I argue that there is an important anomaly to the causalist/compatibilist paradigm in ...
In this paper I integrate the work of a number of philosophers to clarify some psychological issues ...
In Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Richard Holton lays out a detailed account of resolutions, arguing tha...
In his seminal 1971 essay Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, Harry Frankfurt provides...
Abstract What distinguishes persons from other agents is their capacity to form a volition which mea...
Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is bein...
In § 6 of his General Psychopathology (1st edition 1913) Jaspers distinguished between drives, wants...
The paper develops two objections to Michael Bratman’s self-governance approach to the normativity o...
In this paper free volitions are construed as a subclass of reflective judgements in the Kantian mea...
ABSTRACT: In this article I look at some the issues, problems and (it seems to me) self-imposed dile...
In philosophy of mind, desire is an also-ran when it comes to theorizing about mental states- all th...
This paper is an attempt to come to a better understanding of desire through an examination of certa...
Harry Frankfurt has published On Inequality, but this is not the first time he has written about thi...
In this paper I integrate the work of a number of philosophers to clarify some psychological issues ...
In this paper I argue that there is an important anomaly to the causalist/compatibilist paradigm in ...
In this paper I integrate the work of a number of philosophers to clarify some psychological issues ...
In Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Richard Holton lays out a detailed account of resolutions, arguing tha...
In his seminal 1971 essay Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, Harry Frankfurt provides...
Abstract What distinguishes persons from other agents is their capacity to form a volition which mea...
Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is bein...
In § 6 of his General Psychopathology (1st edition 1913) Jaspers distinguished between drives, wants...
The paper develops two objections to Michael Bratman’s self-governance approach to the normativity o...
In this paper free volitions are construed as a subclass of reflective judgements in the Kantian mea...