Add to ORKGWe show that asymmetry in bidders ’ capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collusion and promoting competitive outcomes in multi-unit common value auctions. This effect seems to be related to the increased difficulty of coordination when there are fundamental differences between bidders. The discriminatory auction is shown to be more susceptible to collusion than is the uniform-price auction and consequently asymmetry in capacity constraints plays a more important role in the discriminatory auction. 1 1
We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups each with a Önite number ...
Auctions often involve the sale of many related goods: Treasury, spectrum, and electricity auctions ...
We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare...
We show that asymmetry in bidders ’ capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collu...
Abstract. We show that asymmetry in bidders ’ capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibi...
We show that asymmetry in bidders\u27 capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting col...
The presence of dominant bidders in auctions – those with relatively higher values for the object b...
This paper analyzes a typical procurement market where a few \u85rms compete repeat-edly over a sequ...
We explore the role of capacity constraints in establishing efficient pricing in multi-unit common v...
We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically informed risk...
We present a multi-unit common value auction model with capacity constraints which ensure the partic...
This paper employs a simple model to describe bidding behavior in multi-unit uniform price procureme...
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their deman...
How do informational asymmetries between bidders affect the outcome of common value auctions? Should...
An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-pric...
We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups each with a Önite number ...
Auctions often involve the sale of many related goods: Treasury, spectrum, and electricity auctions ...
We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare...
We show that asymmetry in bidders ’ capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collu...
Abstract. We show that asymmetry in bidders ’ capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibi...
We show that asymmetry in bidders\u27 capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting col...
The presence of dominant bidders in auctions – those with relatively higher values for the object b...
This paper analyzes a typical procurement market where a few \u85rms compete repeat-edly over a sequ...
We explore the role of capacity constraints in establishing efficient pricing in multi-unit common v...
We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically informed risk...
We present a multi-unit common value auction model with capacity constraints which ensure the partic...
This paper employs a simple model to describe bidding behavior in multi-unit uniform price procureme...
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their deman...
How do informational asymmetries between bidders affect the outcome of common value auctions? Should...
An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-pric...
We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups each with a Önite number ...
Auctions often involve the sale of many related goods: Treasury, spectrum, and electricity auctions ...
We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare...