I study a model of dynamic policy making in which citizens do not have com-plete knowledge of how policies are mapped into outcomes. They learn about the mapping through repeated elections as policies are implemented and outcomes observed. I characterize for this environment the policy trajectory with impatient voters. I find that through experimentation good policies are frequently found. However, I show that this is not always the case and demonstrate how policy mak-ing can get stuck at unappealing outcomes, revealing a novel informational failure of policy making. The model also provides insight into the size, direction, and sequencing of optimal policy experiments. Finally, I consider how the structure of political competition affects e...
Most of the political economy literature blames inefficient policies on institutions or politicians’...
This dissertation examines strategic settings in which agents have imperfect information. In the fir...
We introduce experimental research design to the study of policy diffusion in order to better unders...
I study a model of dynamic policy making in which citizens do not have com-plete knowledge of how po...
We study whether and why voters may choose inefficient policies and institutions. We show that a maj...
International audienceWe consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses t...
It is in their potential policy relevance that experiments may make their strongest contribution to ...
AbstractWe consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a ...
When forming policy under conditions of extreme uncertainty, the optimal approach seems to be a proc...
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze issues that arise when policy makers try to learn about...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
First published online: 16 April 2018Policy learning is an attractive proposition, but who learns an...
Policy protagonists are keen to claim that policy is successful while opponents are more likely to f...
Most of the political economy literature blames inefficient policies on institutions or politicians’...
This dissertation examines strategic settings in which agents have imperfect information. In the fir...
We introduce experimental research design to the study of policy diffusion in order to better unders...
I study a model of dynamic policy making in which citizens do not have com-plete knowledge of how po...
We study whether and why voters may choose inefficient policies and institutions. We show that a maj...
International audienceWe consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses t...
It is in their potential policy relevance that experiments may make their strongest contribution to ...
AbstractWe consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a ...
When forming policy under conditions of extreme uncertainty, the optimal approach seems to be a proc...
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze issues that arise when policy makers try to learn about...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Do...
First published online: 16 April 2018Policy learning is an attractive proposition, but who learns an...
Policy protagonists are keen to claim that policy is successful while opponents are more likely to f...
Most of the political economy literature blames inefficient policies on institutions or politicians’...
This dissertation examines strategic settings in which agents have imperfect information. In the fir...
We introduce experimental research design to the study of policy diffusion in order to better unders...