Chapter 2 ‘Truth Predicates ’ in Natural Language

Abstract The aim of this paper is to take a closer look at the actual semantic behavior of what appear to be truth predicates in natural language and to re-assess the way they could motivate particular philosophical views. The paper will draw a distinction between two types of apparent truth predicates: type 1 truth predicates such as in English true and correct and type 2 truth predicates such as English is the case. It will establish the following points: 1. Type 1 truth predicates are true predicates, predicated of a representational objects of some sort, such as sentences, propositions, and entities of the sort of beliefs and assertions. 2. That-clauses with type 1 truth predicates do not act as referential terms, referring to propositions as truth bearers, but rather specify the content of contextually given attitudinal objects, such as ‘John’s belief that S ’ or ‘Mary’s claim that S’. 3. Type 2 ‘truth predicates ’ do not in fact act as truth predicates, but rather express the relation of truthmaking, relating a situation or ‘case’, to the content of a that-clause