Add to ORKGAbstract: In innovative races with winner takes all, leading firms invest less than each follower, given exogenous entry (Reinganum, 1985). But with endogenous entry this result is reversed (Etro, 2004). It is argued here that sharing of rewards between the players may alter these predictions
In the context of an infinitely repeated R&D-race, where firms do not only choose their research eff...
We develop a simple model of competition for the market that shows that, contrary to the Arrow view,...
In this paper we study a one-shot game of R & D between two firms which differ in their incentives t...
Abstract: In innovative races with winner takes all, leading firms invest less than each follower, g...
The focus in this contribution is on innovative technological races with uncertainty as to who will ...
What is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race? Should the winner take all, or is it...
What is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race? Should the winner take all, or is it...
Models of competition for the market with endogenous market structures show that, contrary to the Ar...
The focus of this paper is on the incentives of firms to invest in research and development (R&D) wh...
The focus of this paper is on the incentives of firms to invest in research and development (R&D) wh...
This paper analyzes market structures where leaders have a first mover advan-tage and entry by the f...
Simple models of competition for the market with endogenous entry show that, contrary to the Arrow v...
This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential play in a simple two-player contest framework wit...
New entrants to a market tend to be superior to incumbents in originating radical innovations. We pr...
I characterise endogenous market structures where leaders have a first-mover advantage and entry is ...
In the context of an infinitely repeated R&D-race, where firms do not only choose their research eff...
We develop a simple model of competition for the market that shows that, contrary to the Arrow view,...
In this paper we study a one-shot game of R & D between two firms which differ in their incentives t...
Abstract: In innovative races with winner takes all, leading firms invest less than each follower, g...
The focus in this contribution is on innovative technological races with uncertainty as to who will ...
What is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race? Should the winner take all, or is it...
What is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race? Should the winner take all, or is it...
Models of competition for the market with endogenous market structures show that, contrary to the Ar...
The focus of this paper is on the incentives of firms to invest in research and development (R&D) wh...
The focus of this paper is on the incentives of firms to invest in research and development (R&D) wh...
This paper analyzes market structures where leaders have a first mover advan-tage and entry by the f...
Simple models of competition for the market with endogenous entry show that, contrary to the Arrow v...
This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential play in a simple two-player contest framework wit...
New entrants to a market tend to be superior to incumbents in originating radical innovations. We pr...
I characterise endogenous market structures where leaders have a first-mover advantage and entry is ...
In the context of an infinitely repeated R&D-race, where firms do not only choose their research eff...
We develop a simple model of competition for the market that shows that, contrary to the Arrow view,...
In this paper we study a one-shot game of R & D between two firms which differ in their incentives t...