The strategic organization of political

Firms compete for rents not only within the marketplace, but also through their efforts in the political arena to manipulate regulations, laws and other institutions that govern the marketplace. The field of strategic organization has traditionally focused on the first form of competition, leaving the latter, often distinguished as non-market strategy, largely to scholars from the field of political economy. This research primarily examines how a firm’s political environment – the configuration of formal policymaking institu-tions, regulatory rules, partisan composition and interest group influence – determines the form and efficacy of its non-market behavior, such as lobbying and making donations to political actors. We urge scholars of strategic organization to enter the field of non-market strategy. Because investigation of the process by which firms manage political opportunities and risks requires that the political environment be taken into account, strategic organiza-tion scholars who follow our suggestion will need to cross the disciplinary boundary of positive political economy (PPE). As adherents of multidisciplinary analysis, these scholars are better equipped and likely more willing to cross this boundary than thei