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This paper defends the Rule of Law as set of formal attributes that any regular system of law must possess. However, it disputes the view that the Rule of Law could itself be a form of rule and hence offer criteria of good governance. Consequently, the qualities of fairness and equity associated with Rule of Law must be seen as the product of a certain sort of rule of persons. The argument progresses through an investigation of five worlds of the Rule of Law: Bureaucratia, Monarchia, Communitaria, Libertaria and Respublica. The first, third and fourth attempt to rule through law alone, the second to see the Rule of Law as a form of personal rule. All fail, with the solution provided by the fifth. By ensuring all persons rule each over the others, Respublica offers a form of good governance that produces the forms and substance of the Rule of Law. Martin Hollis acknowledged a far wider role for the political arts than many philosophers. He appreciated how in practical life `the best ’ was frequently `the enemy of the good’, with compromise no bad thing (Bellamy and Hollis 1998). A paragon of civic virtue, he also thought societies functioned well only when people manifested a solidarity with others and were prepared to make sacrifices for the common good. Thus, he saw democratic politics as a useful way of tailoring moral principles to the requirements of particular circumstances, and of generating the collective agreements needed to support those public goods on which personal well-being often depends. Yet, he believed democracy had to be infused with a high degree of morality to achieve these results. Otherwise, he feared majorities could tur