doi:10.1093/mind/fzm603 © Schellenberg 2007 Action and Self-Location in Perception

I offer an explanation of how subjects are able to perceive the intrinsic spatial prop-erties of objects, given that subjects always perceive from a particular location. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that a conception of space is necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. This conception of space is spelled out by showing that perceiving intrinsic properties requires perceiving ob-jects as the kind of things that are perceivable from other locations. Second, I show that having such a conception of space presupposes that a subject represent her loca-tion in relation to perceived objects. More precisely the thesis is that a subject repre-sents her location as the location from which she both perceives objects and would act in relation to objects were she to act. So I argue that perception depends on the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects. It is striking that only agents are perceivers. I argue that it is no coinci-dence. Perceivers are not just passive receivers of information. They are agents in the world. The thesis that perception is dependent on action has a long history in philosophy, but has rarely been argued for in an