Verisimilitude by Power Relations

A number of different theories of truthlikeness have been proposed, but most can be classified into one of two different main programmes: the probability-content programme and the likeness programme.1 In Brink and Heidema [1987] we are offered a further proposal, with the attraction of some novelty. I argue that while the heuristic path taken by the authors is rather remote from what they call 'the well-worn paths',2 in fact their point of arrival is rather closer to existing proposals within the likeness approach than might at first appear. It is the purpose of this note to outline the logical connections and to assess the reasons which have been offered in favour of the new proposal. 1. Suppose we take the assertive force of a statement to be the class of worlds in whichit is true. There may well be other aspects of meaning not captured by such an- identification but for the purposes of verisimilitude this seems to be as fine-grained as is necessary. Suppose further that for any world W worlds are ordered by closeness to, or likeness to, W. The truthlikeness of a propositio