Response to Commentary Disconfirming Moral Foundations Theory on Its Own Terms: Reply to Graham (2015)

People see immorality in sin and sex, but is ‘‘purity’ ’ a unique type of moral content, with unique cognition? Domain-general accounts—and parsimony—suggest that all moral content is processed similarly and that ‘‘purity’ ’ is merely a descriptive label. Conversely, domain-specific theories (e.g., moral foundations theory [MFT]) argue for a special purity module. Consistent with domain-general accounts, we demonstrated that purity concerns are not distinguished from harm concerns—in either MFT or naturalistic scenarios—and that controlling for domain-general dimensions eliminates effects previously ascribed to moral ‘‘mod-ules.’ ’ Here, we reaffirm the strength of our data, exploring how issues raised by Graham reflect only weaknesses in MFT. Importantly, we identify several clear contradictions between Graham’s comment and past-published accounts of MFT. To the extent that MFT stands by its published stimuli, methodologies, and theoretical assumptions, we believe that we have disconfirmed MFT on its own terms