Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism

ABSTRACT: I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that the demand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair or question-begging one. 1. The Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism I am a broad-minded epistemologist: I believe that epistemic justification is conferred by appearances of all sorts, whether sensory, intellectual, mnemonic, or introspective. In short, I endorse Phenomenal Conservatism: PC If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p.1 I take statements of the form “it seems to S that p ” or “it appears to S that p ” to describe a kind of propositional attitude, different from belief, of which sensory experience, apparent memory, intuition, and apparent introspective awareness are species. This type of mental state may be termed an “appearance. ” PC holds that it is by virtue of having an appearance with