This article presents a model of talent investments where two clubs compete for prizes. Our model is based on a general class of cost functions with a constant elasticity of marginal costs with respect to investments. The analysis finds that reduced revenue sharing improves competitive balance. Furthermore, we show that a higher elasticity of marginal costs with respect to investments enhances competitive balance and simulta-neously reduces the negative effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance
The aim of this paper is to clarify the apparent confusion in the literature about the impact of a r...
This paper investigates revenue sharing in an asymmetric two team contest model of a sports league w...
Szymanski (2004) explained that at a noncooperative Nash equilibrium for talent choice in a team spo...
This article presents a model of talent investments where two clubs compete for prizes. Our model is...
This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weight...
This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weight...
This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weight...
National audienceRecent papers have enriched the conventional modeling of teams’ behavior through a ...
We employ a model of n heterogenous profit-maximizing clubs to analyze the impact of revenue sharing...
This short paper, challenging the so-called invariance proposition, argues that, for a general n-tea...
In this article, a distinction is made between two types of competitive imbalances, the good and the...
This paper presents a dynamic model of talent investments in a team sports league with an infinite t...
This paper presents a dynamic model of talent investments in a team sports league with an infinite t...
The aim of this article is to clarify the apparent confusion in the literature about the impact of a...
We employ a model of n heterogenous profit-maximizing clubs to analyze the impact of revenue sharing...
The aim of this paper is to clarify the apparent confusion in the literature about the impact of a r...
This paper investigates revenue sharing in an asymmetric two team contest model of a sports league w...
Szymanski (2004) explained that at a noncooperative Nash equilibrium for talent choice in a team spo...
This article presents a model of talent investments where two clubs compete for prizes. Our model is...
This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weight...
This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weight...
This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weight...
National audienceRecent papers have enriched the conventional modeling of teams’ behavior through a ...
We employ a model of n heterogenous profit-maximizing clubs to analyze the impact of revenue sharing...
This short paper, challenging the so-called invariance proposition, argues that, for a general n-tea...
In this article, a distinction is made between two types of competitive imbalances, the good and the...
This paper presents a dynamic model of talent investments in a team sports league with an infinite t...
This paper presents a dynamic model of talent investments in a team sports league with an infinite t...
The aim of this article is to clarify the apparent confusion in the literature about the impact of a...
We employ a model of n heterogenous profit-maximizing clubs to analyze the impact of revenue sharing...
The aim of this paper is to clarify the apparent confusion in the literature about the impact of a r...
This paper investigates revenue sharing in an asymmetric two team contest model of a sports league w...
Szymanski (2004) explained that at a noncooperative Nash equilibrium for talent choice in a team spo...