1 The philosophy of normativity or how to try clearing things up a little

Normativity, one of the central themes of philosophy in the last decade,1 represents a vast and fertile terrain of questions. The normative domain is frequently conceived in opposition to the descriptive, so that saying what ought to be or ought to be done is considered fundamentally different from saying what is. Ought is thus often considered the paradigmatic normative concept.2 However, in general, it is admitted that the concepts of rule, value and virtue, but also reason, whether about the reason to act or to think, are normative in kind. Among these concepts, it is common to distinguish between, on the one hand, evaluative concepts (such as good and bad, but also admirable and contemptible, just and unjust, benevolent and malevolent, etc.) and, on the other, deontic concepts (such as obligatory, permissible and forbidden).3 We should note that it is not clear that all normative concepts fall into one or other of these categories. For example, it could well be that the concept of reason constitutes a third normative category. As the variety of normative terms shows, normative discourse plays a central role in our lives. And we accept that there are things that we ought or ought not to think, feel