OBJECTS AND ATTITUDES

The concebt of an altittidiiial object hm long been present in p s y clioaiialyssis but almost entirely neglected. This omission ts integral in the coifmion and controversy about the object concept in general. It has lpft a theoretical gap wliicli the so-called object relations flieoties have attein/ted to Jill. This paper offers some preliinbiary suggestions for a psjclioanaljfic uiiderstandiiig of attitudes as a first level of itference in the study of relatioiuliijs arid their psy-cliological basis. HERE EXISTS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC TIIEORY a significant gap T in the conceptualization of human relationships and the psychological basis of relationships. This gap affects the for-mation of theory and the conduct of clinical practice directly. It consists of inadequate recognition of mental states and mental attitudes, and is both caused by and causative of confusion and ambiguity in the psychoanalytic concept “object.” The purpose of this paper is to explore the deficit in the psychoanalytic object concept, to point out some reasons for that deficit, and to offer, as a remedy, preliminary suggestions for a better conceptualization of personal attitudes. Background The background for the position I am presenting lies in my study, first, of the work of Freud and then of other analysts, in the area of the object concept. The psychoanalytic object concept is complex; the term “object ” is multiply ambiguous