No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and

This article reports a test of a structural model of the antecedents of genocide and politicide (politicalmass murder). A case–control research design is used to test alternative specifications of a mul-tivariate model that identifies preconditions of geno-/politicide. The universe of analysis consists of 126 instances of internal war and regime collapse that began between 1955 and 1997, as identified by the State Failure project. Geno-/politicides began during 35 of these episodes of state failure. The analytic question is which factors distinguish the 35 episodes that led to geno-/politicides from those that did not. The case–control method is used to estimate the effects of theoretically specified domestic and international risk factors measured one year prior to the onset of geno-/politicide. The optimal model includes six factors that jointly make it possible to distinguish with 74 % accuracy between internal wars and regime collapses that do and those that do not lead to geno-/politicide. The conclusion uses the model to assess the risks of future episodes in 25 countries. “We must remember not only what hap-pened but why and how it happened.”In remembering the Holocaust “we need to learn its lessons and apply them to contemporary events ” (Mattas 1992, 185). What has been learned? We know that genocides and political mass murders are recurrent phenomena; that since WWII nearly 50 such events have happened; that these episodes have cost the lives of at least 12 million and as many as 22 million noncombatants, more than all victims of inter-nal and international wars since 1945;1 and that human suffering rarely mobilized policymakers into action. We also know that despite Cambodia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, some lessons have been learned. Durin