THE JURISDICTIONAL BASIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

“And so today the peoples of the world ask for philosophical vision in meeting the practical question: What rights, if any, can a man claim of me not because he is my brother or my neighbor or my colleague or co-religionist or fellow-citizen, but just because he’s human?”2 It is generally accepted that human rights abuses, like genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, have a long history. 3 Human rights advocate Richard Falk asks, is this indulgence of genocidal politics simply inherent to world order, or can it be overcome by a series of reforms such as establishing an enforcement capability under the control of a financially independent UN or regional auspices, thereby weakening the ties to geopolitical calculations; [and] creating an international criminal court with competence to address genocide?4 As Falk notes, the International Criminal Court represents an idealistic mentality, optimistic about the possibility of reforming the international system in order to prevent certain behaviour by establishing an international authority capable of punishment and deterrence. Growing support for the International Criminal Court can be directly related to the growth of legal regimes committed to the protection of human rights, and to the growth of international humanitarian law, which presupposes a conception of the individual as the bearer of rights and obligations, as well as an interest in protecting the individual from gross violations of human rights. Now that the International Criminal Court has received sufficient ratifications from Member States of the United Nations, it exists as a legal entity with jurisdiction over international crimes and a 1 Sarah Viau (M.A.) is an LL.B. candidate at Queen’s University