Question: How can the evolution of turn-taking be explained in species without language? Features of model: Using a genetic algorithm incorporating mutation and crossover, we studied noisy decision making in three repeated two-player games in which we predicted on theoretical grounds that cooperative turn-taking would evolve and three games in which we expected synchronized cooperation to evolve. Ranges of key variables: We set population size to 20, number of rounds to be played by each pair in each generation to 200, and number of evolutionary generations to 2000, and we repeated each simulation 10 times to check the stability of the results. Results: Cooperative turn-taking and (unexpectedly) a form of double turn-taking evolved in the a...
Funding: J.B.P. acknowledges funding from the Burroughs Wellcome Fund, the David and Lucile Packard ...
The evolution of cooperation is frequently analysed in terms of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game...
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in thi...
International audienceMutualistic cooperation often requires multiple individuals to behave in a coo...
A genetic algorithm incorporating mutation and crossing-over was used to investigate the evolution o...
<div><p>Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally like...
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally likely, i.e....
Cooperative interactions among individuals are ubiquitous despite the possibility of exploitation by...
We study evolutionary dynamics in a population of individuals engaged in pairwise social interaction...
Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with...
In social evolution theory, unconditional cooperation has been seen as an evolutionarily unsuccessfu...
Reciprocity and repeated games have been at the center of attention when studying the evolution of h...
Evolutionary game theory has become one of the most diverse and far reaching theories in biology. Ap...
In reality, most individuals are prone to vary strategies when interacting with their counterparts; ...
In many evolutionary algorithms, crossover is the main operator used in generating new individuals ...
Funding: J.B.P. acknowledges funding from the Burroughs Wellcome Fund, the David and Lucile Packard ...
The evolution of cooperation is frequently analysed in terms of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game...
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in thi...
International audienceMutualistic cooperation often requires multiple individuals to behave in a coo...
A genetic algorithm incorporating mutation and crossing-over was used to investigate the evolution o...
<div><p>Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally like...
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally likely, i.e....
Cooperative interactions among individuals are ubiquitous despite the possibility of exploitation by...
We study evolutionary dynamics in a population of individuals engaged in pairwise social interaction...
Evolutionary game theory describes systems where individual success is based on the interaction with...
In social evolution theory, unconditional cooperation has been seen as an evolutionarily unsuccessfu...
Reciprocity and repeated games have been at the center of attention when studying the evolution of h...
Evolutionary game theory has become one of the most diverse and far reaching theories in biology. Ap...
In reality, most individuals are prone to vary strategies when interacting with their counterparts; ...
In many evolutionary algorithms, crossover is the main operator used in generating new individuals ...
Funding: J.B.P. acknowledges funding from the Burroughs Wellcome Fund, the David and Lucile Packard ...
The evolution of cooperation is frequently analysed in terms of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game...
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in thi...