1 The Problem of Unconceived Objections Forthcoming in Argumentation

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that, just as the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA) provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Science to the effect that a realist view of science is unwarranted, the Problem of Unconceived Objections (PUO) provides a basis for a New Induction on the History of Philosophy to the effect that a realist view of philosophy is unwarranted. I raise this problem not only for skepticism’s sake but also for the sake of making a point about philosophical argumentation, namely, that anticipating objections to one’s claim is not the same as supporting one’s claim. In other words, defending p from objections does not amount to support or evidence for p. This, in turn, presents dialectical and pragma-dialectical approaches to argumentation with the following question: does proper argumentation require that arguers anticipate and respond to unconceived objections