Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference

In a recent article, Adam Elga outlines a strategy for “Defeating Dr Evil with Self-Locating Belief”. The strategy relies on an indifference princi-ple that is not up to the task. In general, there are two things to dislike about indifference principles: adopting one normally means confusing risk for uncertainty, and they tend to lead to incoherent views in some ‘paradoxical ’ situations. I argue that both kinds of objection can be lev-elled against Elga’s indifference principle. There are also some difficulties with the concept of evidence that Elga uses, and these create further dif-ficulties for the principle. In a recent article, Adam Elga outlines a strategy for “Defeating Dr Evil with Self-Locating Belief”. The strategy relies on an indifference principle that is not up to the task. In general, there are two things to dislike about indifference principles: adopting one normally means confusing risk for uncertainty, and they tend to lead to incoherent views in some ‘paradoxical ’ situations. Each kind of objection can b