Add to ORKGThe simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids promote price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. I examine the auction design and its performance in practice.
Abstract: This paper proposes an ascending auction for efficiently allocat-ing multiple complementar...
In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simu...
Discussion paper - CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, n° 9952In an example where some bidders h...
A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending- bid or a sealed-bid format. The cri...
When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcom...
We explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided combinatorial auctions for a previously unte...
We explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided combinatorial auctions for a previously unte...
We compare efficiency and susceptibility to collusion of two alternative ways to sell multiple objec...
We analyze the dynamic simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), which was pioneered by the US Federal C...
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raise challenging problems. We assume that ...
We explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided combinatorial auctions for a previously unte...
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with various strategic problems, depending on prefere...
We use theory and experiment to explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided, combinatorial ...
Sequential and simultaneous auctions are two important mechanisms for buying and selling multiple ob...
The paper investigates the revenue and efficiency of different ascending price auction architectures...
Abstract: This paper proposes an ascending auction for efficiently allocat-ing multiple complementar...
In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simu...
Discussion paper - CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, n° 9952In an example where some bidders h...
A key question of auction design is whether to use an ascending- bid or a sealed-bid format. The cri...
When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcom...
We explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided combinatorial auctions for a previously unte...
We explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided combinatorial auctions for a previously unte...
We compare efficiency and susceptibility to collusion of two alternative ways to sell multiple objec...
We analyze the dynamic simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), which was pioneered by the US Federal C...
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raise challenging problems. We assume that ...
We explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided combinatorial auctions for a previously unte...
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with various strategic problems, depending on prefere...
We use theory and experiment to explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided, combinatorial ...
Sequential and simultaneous auctions are two important mechanisms for buying and selling multiple ob...
The paper investigates the revenue and efficiency of different ascending price auction architectures...
Abstract: This paper proposes an ascending auction for efficiently allocat-ing multiple complementar...
In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simu...
Discussion paper - CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, n° 9952In an example where some bidders h...