MIT

Some epistemic modal expressions are stronger than others. By asserting any expression in the list (1), a speaker stakes herself to a stronger claim than she would by asserting the next in the list: (1) a. It must be raining. b. It is almost certainly raining. c. It, presumably, is raining. d. It might be raining. That much is clear.1 But what about the relation between one of these modalized claims and the bare prejacent it is raining? Where does that belong on the list? Is it stronger or weaker than “strong ” epistemic necessity modals like must in English? That is less clear and is our focus in this paper. The basic quantificational treatment of modality makes a clear prediction. Since must is English’s way of representing an operator of epistemic necessity, it quantifies over possibilities compatible with what is known, saying that all of them are possibilities in which the prejacent is true. Whatever is known is true, and so the actual situation is always among those compatible with what is known. Thus, for any φ, mustφ entails φ. The strong modalized claim is stronger than the bare prejacent. Thus, φ’s proper place on the list is below ∗ This is the fourth installment in our trilogy of papers on epistemic modality. We would lik