Cooperation in stochastic inventory models with continuous review

Consider multiple companies that continuously review their inventories and face Poisson demand. We study cooperation strategies for these companies and analyse if there exist allocations of the joint cost such that any company has lower costs than on its own; such allocations are called stable cost allocations. We start with two companies that jointly place an order for replenishment if their joint inventory position reaches a certain reorder level. This strategy leads to a simple expression of the joint costs. However, these costs exceed the costs for non-cooperating companies. Therefore, we examine another cooperation strategy. Namely, the companies reorder as soon as one of them reaches its reorder level. This latter strategy has lower costs than for non-cooperating companies. Numerical experiments show that the game-theoretical distribution rule — a cost allocation in which the companies share the procurement cost and each pays its own holding cost — is a stable cost allocation. These results also hold for situations with multiple companies. Key words: joint replenishment, stochastic demand, cost allocation, distribution rule, continuous review, game theory, inventory model