Transhumanism, Human Dignity, and Moral Status

Status? ” Fabrice Jotterand argues that transhumanism is incompatible with human dignity--i.e. that technologically augmented individuals (transhumans) would not possess the dignity that non-technologically augmented human beings possess. In this commentary we argue that Jotterand’s case against the possibility of transhuman dignity is unsound. We then sketch a positive argument for the view that it is possible for transhuman individuals to have the same sort of dignity possessed by human beings. Jotterand’s Argument Against Transhuman Dignity Jotterand focuses his case against the possibility of transhuman dignity on Nick Bostrom’s (2005) conception of transhuman dignity. The case against Bostrom consists of two main arguments. The first targets Bostrom’s claim that human dignity admits of degrees. Jotterand argues that any adequate conception of human dignity underwrites the moral equality of those that possess dignity. The second argument defends an account of the sources of human dignity and aims to show that transhumans lack the basis for dignity. None of the premises in Jotterand’s second argument are particular to Bostrom’s account. It therefore functions as a general argument against the possibility of transhuman dignity. We believe that Jotterand's firs