In this paper the Borda rule is extended by allowing the voters to show their preferences among alterna-tives through linguistic labels. To this aim, we need to add them up for assigning a qualification to each alternative and then to compare such qualifications. Theoretically, all these assessments and comparisons fall into a totally ordered commutative monoid generated by the initial set of linguistic labels. Practically, we show an example which illustrates the suitability of this linguistic approach. Finally, some interesting properties for this Borda rule are proven in the Social Choice context
International audienceIn this paper, we propose an interactive version of the Borda method for colle...
In ‘Normative Uncertainty as a Voting Problem’, William MacAskill argues that positive credence in o...
In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case ...
In this paper the Borda rule is extended by allowing the voters to show their preferences among alte...
When the members of a group have to make a decision, they can use a voting rule to aggregate their p...
This project is an exploration of a voting procedure in Social Choice theory called the partial Bord...
A new aggregation rule in social choice voting with linguistic intensities of preferences between pa...
A new aggregation rule in social choice voting with linguistic intensities of preferences between pa...
In social choice voting, majorities based on difference of votes and their extension, majorities bas...
In order to characterize the set of desirable social choice functions, researchers have proposed axi...
We say that a preference profile exhibits pairwise consensus around some fixed preference relation, ...
The problem of finding a solution set of alternatives when a linguistic preference relation represen...
Back in the eighteenth century, the works of Borda and Condorcet laid the foundations of social choi...
We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying the qualified majo...
Borda Count is one of the earliest and most important voting rules. Going far beyond voting, we summ...
International audienceIn this paper, we propose an interactive version of the Borda method for colle...
In ‘Normative Uncertainty as a Voting Problem’, William MacAskill argues that positive credence in o...
In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case ...
In this paper the Borda rule is extended by allowing the voters to show their preferences among alte...
When the members of a group have to make a decision, they can use a voting rule to aggregate their p...
This project is an exploration of a voting procedure in Social Choice theory called the partial Bord...
A new aggregation rule in social choice voting with linguistic intensities of preferences between pa...
A new aggregation rule in social choice voting with linguistic intensities of preferences between pa...
In social choice voting, majorities based on difference of votes and their extension, majorities bas...
In order to characterize the set of desirable social choice functions, researchers have proposed axi...
We say that a preference profile exhibits pairwise consensus around some fixed preference relation, ...
The problem of finding a solution set of alternatives when a linguistic preference relation represen...
Back in the eighteenth century, the works of Borda and Condorcet laid the foundations of social choi...
We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying the qualified majo...
Borda Count is one of the earliest and most important voting rules. Going far beyond voting, we summ...
International audienceIn this paper, we propose an interactive version of the Borda method for colle...
In ‘Normative Uncertainty as a Voting Problem’, William MacAskill argues that positive credence in o...
In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case ...