Three Problems of Intersubjectivity—And One Solution∗

Social thinkers often use the concept of intersubjectivity to mark out a problem of theoretical sociology: If people are unable to look into each others ’ minds, why do they often understand each other nonetheless? This issue has been debated ex-tensively by philosophers and sociologists in three largely disconnected discourses. The article investigates the three discourses for isolable ideas that can be fitted into a sociological answer to the problem of intersubjectivity. An interactional so-lution, fully coherent with key insights from the discourses, is offered at the end of the article. Its main point is to identify coordinative interactional mechanisms that compel participants to “make themselves understandable ” vis-à-vis their interaction partners. The concept of intersubjectivity has fascinated sociologists for more than half a century. With its implied promise of a connection (“inter”) between seemingly au-tonomous selves (“subjects”), it appears to express a core aspect of sociality. At the same time, the mere availability of the concept marks the existence of such a connection as contingent, as something that cannot always be taken for grante