Hosted by Iowa Research Online. For more information please contact: lib-ir@uiowa.edu. Split-Ticket Voting: The Effects of Cognitive

Split-ticket voting has recently received special attention, because it provides a possible microlevel explanation for institutionally divided government. Are split-ticket voters intentional, selecting one party for president and another for Congress, in order to somehow check and balance government? A general model of split-ticket voting is specified, taking into account the important but neglected interaction effects of party, candidate quality, and incumbency. Then, cognitive Madisonian variables are incorporated and logistic regression models estimated on 1992 and 1996 national election data. Strong cognitive Madisonian effects are found. Model Madisonians, who seek to divide power and balance policy, make up over 20 % of the electorate and may be largely responsible for the observed patterns of division at the aggregate level. Why do American voters split the ticket, choosing one party for the White House and another for Congress? Are they “cognitive Madisonians ” (Ladd 1990), splitting the ticket after a conscious decision that it is somehow “good ” to check power and balance policy, as our nation’s Founders might have wanted? Indirect evidence of opinion surveys suggests they might be. Nationwide polls in the post-World War II period have repeatedly demonstrated that Americans favor divide